National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)

The Insider Threat to Critical Infrastructures

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Scope

- ☐ The Study addressed the deliverables assigned in the January 16 letter from Secretary Chertoff in two phases: Phase I (January 2007 October 2007)
 - □ Define the "insider threat" physical and cyber, including potential consequences, economic or otherwise
 - Analyze the dynamics and scope of the insider threat including critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
 - □ Analyze the potential impact of globalization on the critical infrastructure marketplace and insider issues
 - ☐ Identify/define the obstacles to addressing the insider threat

Phase II (October 2007 - March 2008)

- $\hfill \Box$ Identify issues, potential problems, and consequences associated with screening employees
- Identify legal, policy, and procedural barriers aspects of the issue, as well as any potential obstacles, from the perspective of the owners and operators
- ☐ Identify and make policy recommendations on potential remedies for addressing the insider threat (up to and including potential legislation)

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Objective

- First Phase focused on defining the insider threat to critical infrastructures, including dynamics involved, obstacles to mitigation, and the effect of globalization
- The Second Phase of the study focused on addressing legal, procedural, and policy barriers to private sector infrastructure operator employee screening efforts
- The study has produced recommendations for stakeholders that when adopted will enable CIKR operators to manage the risk from the insider threat

The Study's Effort to Date

- Held 4 workshop meetings to discuss key issues and develop the recommendations
- Held 45 conference call discussions
- Met with 28 Subject Matter Experts

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Recommendations Overview

- ■Policy recommendations for near term solutions:
 - Establish insider threat resources
 - Communicate threat awareness
 - ■Support improved employee screening
- ■Path forward for highly complex issues:
 - ■Globalization risks for CIKR operators
 - ■Technology solutions and tools
 - ■Understanding the relationship between criminal history and employment risk

Stakeholders: The President

- ■Accept and implement the Report and its recommendations
- ■Establish the recommended Executive Outreach and Awareness program within the Executive Office of the President

Stakeholders: Congress

- Read the report to gain understanding of recommended policies
- ■Provide criminal history records access to CIKR owners and operators for employee screening, per the 2006 Attorney General's report
- □Implement low-cost, high-return solutions for improving CIKR security against insider threats
 - ■Insider Threat Outreach and Awareness
 - ■Insider Threat Clearinghouse Support function
- □ Federal agencies have good ideas on insider threats need to cross pollinate and communicate these ideas

Stakeholders: DHS and Federal Agencies

- □Implement near-term recommendations
 - ■Share information on insider threat risks
 - Establish insider threat clearinghouse resource
- ■Establish, plan, and coordinate follow-on work and Research
 - Globalization research
 - ■Technology solutions research
 - Supply chain vulnerability solutions
- ■Establish ongoing dialog to communicate the Report's message to the relevant audiences

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Stakeholders: Sector Partners

- □Implement recommendation for Sectorspecific insider threat information sharing mechanisms (ISACs and SCCs)
- □Coordinate with report-recommended government resources
- ■Educate and Communicate to Sector CIKR owners and operators:
 - Insider threat awareness and risk
 - ■The findings and resources in the Report

Stakeholders: CIKR Operators

- ■Become informed on the insider threat to critical infrastructures
- ■Apply insider threat risk discovery approaches to develop an optimal insider threat program
- ■Use best practices frameworks to begin tailoring an insider threat mitigation program
- Work with established information sharing/ clearinghouse Sector organizations on insider threat information sharing

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Stakeholders: Value for the Public

- Provide a new path toward improved security and more reliable critical infrastructure services
 - ■Vital to economic stability, public health, confidence in institutions, and general public welfare.
- ■Employee screening approach balances public's concerns with security needs

Summary

- ■The NIAC was able to define the insider threat to critical infrastructures and outline the growing effect of globalization
- Reviewed the legal and policy issues surrounding the insider threat and employee screening
 - ■Recommend adopting provisions of the 2006 Attorney General's Report
- ■Recommendations provide public and private sector CIKR partners the means to better manage the insider threat
- ■The NIAC found individuals and organizations with expertise on aspects of the insider threat
 - ■The recommendations will help to distribute this knowledge and these best practices
- ■More research needs to be done on globalization issues and technology solutions

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Questions?